Drivers of Conflict in Urban Infrastructure: Case Study of the New Yogyakarta Airport

MUCHAMAD IMAM FITRIANTORO *
Institute for Democracy, Security, and Strategic Studies (IDESSS)
Rukan Tanjung Mas Raya Blok B 1/ No.7, Tanjung Barat, South Jakarta 12530
Indonesia
E-mail: muchamadimam123@gmail.com

ABSTRACT
The study discusses the drivers of conflict in the construction of Yogyakarta International Airport (YIA) in Temon, Kulon Progo, using a politico-economic framework. This research employs the theory of land-based elite domination of urban growth machines and theories that explain the drivers of conflicts caused by construction and development of infrastructure. The findings of this study show that the conflict was driven by disagreements on land resource that emerged from the government’s ambition to respond to the pressure to transform the rural lands in the region into an urban area under the concepts of aerotropolis and MICE. The pressure came from the interests of local and national elite groups, which complemented the extant problem of domination of land ownership by the local political elites of Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta. Thus, the conflict was related to not only the development of infrastructure but also a land conflict that arose from urban development policies. The other drivers of the conflict include poor governance of the project and social factors.

Keywords: agrarian conflict, infrastructure, political economy, urban politics, elite domination.

DOI: https://doi.org/10.7454/jp.v6i1.214

* The author is a junior researcher at IDESSS.
INTRODUCTION

Discourse on the tourism industry is relatively new to the field of research on land and natural resource conflicts in the past decade. There are several reasons for this lack of discussion on this subject: (1) the fragmentation of the tourism industry and the many stakeholders involved; (2) the industry’s association with leisure and tertiary needs, resulting in issues or cases of eviction being ignored; and (3) the concentration of advocacy groups’ focus on the violation of land rights by extractive industries—such as mining and agroindustry—because of the large scope of land right violations. However, access to land is a necessary prerequisite for the growth of tourism, supported by the provision of public facilities and infrastructure.

Land conflicts in the face of the growth of the tourism industry can be attributed to various factors, such as the rights of the people impacted, management of the tourism industry or business, and the environmental, economic, and social risks that the project or its development poses (Boudet, Jayasurendra, and Davis 2011; Ghimire 2012). Conflicts may also ensue because of information discrepancy (Park et al. 2017). At certain stages of intensity, conflicts may also be triggered by the failure to tend to the demands of the people or parties involved; by difference in perceptions during consultation and compensation; by problems in administrative procedure; and by the lack of government efforts to resolve the conflicts (Lam and Woo 2009). The analysis of political economy in studies on conflicts pertaining to infrastructure development cannot be ignored, such as an explanation on elite domination of infrastructure policies (Musgrave and Wong 2016). The exploitation of natural resources for the development of infrastructure that only benefits the elites may also be a cause for conflict (Mashatt, Long, and Crum 2008).

Conflicts caused by elite domination may happen due to the scarcity and monopoly of resources by the state, private companies, or social elites through the acquisition/seizure of resources (Robbins 2012). This elite domination is in accordance with what is called elite capture, that is, the effort or measures taken by those in possession of power and
wealth to reap benefits from new opportunities and accumulate wealth and power (Colfer and Capistrano 2006). The present research aims to show that drivers of infrastructure development-related conflicts are not limited to problems in management or governance and the social and economic effects of the projects but also extend to the elites’ domination, which results in policies that mainly cater to their interests. These conflict drivers are reflected in the case of the construction of the New Yogyakarta International Airport (NYIA) in Temon District, Kulon Progo Regency, Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta/Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY).

Construction and investment in infrastructure are integral to the process of transitional urban development. In other words, investment and development of infrastructure are prerequisites for the growth of urban areas (Ingram and Kessides 1994). The author’s findings show that conflicts pertaining to urban development are caused by land conflicts that emerge as a result the government’s ambition to respond to the pressure to develop rural areas into urban areas, using the concept of aerotropolis. Land conflicts tend to intensify when faced with the rapid growth of urban areas in peri-urban zones, which is indicated by the transition of areal use from rural to urban use (Lombard 2016). These pressures are result of the interests of the national and local elites, as well as the domination of land ownership by local political elites in DIY.

Furthermore, vertical conflicts between the residents impacted by the construction and the political-economic elites involved in the development of the NYIA megaproject are often linked to risks of ecologic degradation, which were discussed in academic studies by NGOs and intellectual as well as environmental groups. Similar to other recent and complex agrarian conflicts in Indonesia, these conflicts happen due to the absence of efforts to resolve them, issues and threats related to environmental destruction, and the concentration of land ownership among a number of elites (Rachman 2015). The emergence of agrarian conflicts cannot be separated from the government’s economic ambition to bolster infrastructure development. The Joko Widodo administration planned to achieve this target through three key steps: ease in
the granting of licenses, provision of land, and funding through loans (Wahid et al. 2017). These steps show how the development of physical infrastructure emphasizes goals, while it marginalizes the people’s interests and participation. Therefore, the research question that the author aims to answer in this study is, what are the drivers of the conflict in the case of the NYIA megaproject construction in Temon District, Kulon Progo Regency in 2012–18?

LITERATURE REVIEW

Land-based elite domination in urban growth machine theory

This theory is derived from the theory of the urban as a growth machine, which is essentially developed based on elite theory. The theory’s main thesis is that the orientation of urban or local development policies tends to revolve around elite interests through the intensification of land use. Through a neo-marxist approach, this theory was then developed by Molotch (1976), who regard the urban area as a competition arena in the field of land development. This premise is based on the logic of the modern state, where land is regarded as the most valuable commodity to obtain economic benefits.

In the shaping of the urban system, Harding (1995) states that there is an exclusive correlation between two types of power, parochial capital and metropolitan capital. Parochial capital possesses assets in the form of land and other immovable property, while metropolitan capital holds assets in the form of money or investment. These two types of power coalesce to productively develop land based on its exchange value, which is the opposite of its use value (Vogel 1997).

In Logan and Molotch’s theory, a clash of interests happens between the pro-growth coalition and anti-growth coalition. The strongest driver behind the growth of an urban area is the pro-growth coalition that is formed by land-based elites, who comprise politicians and business groups. These entities have control over material and intellectual resources to increase the value of land ownership (Parker 2004). Con-
versely, the antigrowth coalition believes that development initiatives do not always bring benefits but, rather, negative impacts, such as the marginalization of independent economic management and environmental degradation. To them, these impacts are the manifestation of elite interests (Molotch 1976).

This theory is founded on several explicit key concepts (Rodgers 2009). The first concept pertains to exchange value, use value, and space. This concept regards space as a commodity not only as the basis of collective livelihood or a result of social activities but also as means to acquire wealth. The second concept is the land-based elites or place entrepreneurs, who are elites involved in the commodification of land exchange and lease. Land-based elites are those who acquire the ownership of land through inheritance or feudalism and purchase (Rodgers 2009). The third concept is the growth machine alliance, or the coalition of elites, which comprises land-based elites who have domination and influence over the orientation of urban development initiatives. These elites have strong connections with local politicians, media, and transportation agencies or companies. The fourth concept is asset or mobile capital, which unites the interests of elites that fuel the growth machine. The fifth concept is the promotion of growth as a public good (Rodgers 2009).

**Drivers of conflicts in the development of infrastructure projects**

Based on research from Watkins et al. (2017) on conflicts in the development of infrastructure projects in Latin America and the Caribbean over five decades, there are several categories of drivers of conflicts in infrastructure projects: (1) environmental, (2) social, (3) governance, (4) economic. These drivers are interrelated; the emergence of one driver will stimulate the emergence of the others (Watkins et al. 2017). Two main driver categories are relevant to this research: the governance and social drivers. The governance driver emerges because of bad project planning that comprises the setting of location and the development of the area postconstruction, as well as minimum consultation between
the project executor and the people. The environmental driver in this conflict is linked to several issues, such as the degradation of the ecosystem, pollution, deforestation, and climate change caused by the infrastructure project (Watkins et al. 2017).

The economic driver is related to several aspects. First, the inability of the government to complete the project in accordance with its initial planning. Second, the unfair distribution of benefits that drew complaints on the centralization of benefits to only urban areas by the local communities. Third, the overpriced services and benefits of the infrastructure. The local community and stakeholders often agree that the costs of projects are too high, which result in the high price of services they provide. Fourth, conflicts that involve demands to increase the wage of workers (Watkins et al. 2017).

The social driver pertains to the societal perception that certain projects only bring unsatisfactory benefits or compensation, or harm to the local community and stakeholders. Several examples of these issues are the deprivation of access to farming and water resources that make up the independent economic management or the community’s livelihood, as well as a low number of job vacancies. The impact on the society’s traditional values often also plays a part in the emergence of resistance from the impacted communities (Watkins et al. 2017).

RESEARCH METHOD

In this research, the author employs a qualitative method, a social research approach that aims to analyze a social phenomenon holistically and comprehensively. According to Creswell (2003), qualitative research is a method that analyzes the condition of an object or phenomenon, in which the researcher is the key instrument. Thus, the research is conducted in an interactive manner and involves the exchange of social experiences as perceived by the involved individuals. The data collection techniques that the author employs in this research are literature reviews, observation, in-depth interview, and documentation. In analyzing the present case, the author uses a neo-marxist approach, which regards economic factors, including production and transaction/exchange, as
the triggers to social changes in capitalistic societies. These changes usually occur through conflictual interclass interactions. These interactions are integral to the domination and exploitation expressed by the radical egalitarianism employed by a normative Marxist agenda (Wright 2005).

DISCUSSION

Context of agrarian politics in Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta

Although the status of Kasultanan Yogyakarta was changed to DIY on March 3, 1950, after the country’s independence, the laws of the land in the region are still based on the monarchical concept that regards the sultan as the dominant ruler. This provision is part of Law No. 3/1950, Article 4 Clause 1 Point 3 that stipulates the autonomy of DIY, including its agrarian and land matters. In relation to this provision, the government of DIY established Perda (Regional Regulation) No. 5/1954 on Land Rights outside Kota Praja, while lands inside the borders of Kota Praja are still governed by old regulations from the Dutch colonial era (Dewa 2017).

The Kasultanan land is divided into two parts: SG, which comprises Kota Yogyakarta, Sleman, Bantul, Gunung Kidul, and the mountainous area of Kulon Progo; and PAG, which comprises the southern coast of Kabupaten Kulon Progo. SG includes the crown Domain, which consists of inheritable governmental attributes, such as the palace, the city square, kepatihan, pasar ngasem, guest houses, the Gunung Kidul Forest, and the Grand Mosque as well as the Sutanaad Ground, along with the rights given to the people (Putra 2015). Usually, the land use of SG is accompanied by Surat kekancingan from the Panitikismo. PAG is the land ruled by Kadipaten Pakualaman and cultivated by its people or the Kadipaten itself. The village authorities are given rights to use and develop tanah Kas Desa, both from the Kadipaten and the Kasultanan, as their pay (Hasim 2016).
On September 24, 1960, the government passed Law No. 5 on Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) to unify the national laws on agrarian land. However, before 1984, the enactment of the UUPA did not apply to the entirety of DIY. The fourth dictum of the UUPA stipulates that the rights and authority over land and water in the area and ex-area of swapraja (self-government) are given to the state since the enactment of the UUPA and would be further regulated through PP (Government Regulations-Peraturan Pemerintah). To fill in the gap in the law caused by the yet-to-be-formulated PP, the government of DIY enacted Special Regional Regulation or Perda Istimewa (Perdais) No. 5/1954 and Perda No. 10/1964 (Dewa 2017).

In 1973, Sultan HB IX sent a request to the minister of home affairs, who held the authority to oversee national agrarian matters at the time, to treat DIY equally to other regions in regard to agrarian matters. The request was granted through the formulation of Presidential Decree (Keppres) No. 3/1984, which stipulates the UUPA 1960 to be fully enacted in DIY and regulated by the Ministry of Home Affairs (Mardaningrum 2010). The enactment of the Keppres meant that the country’s agrarian laws were to apply nationally, including the swapraja (self-government) regions of DIY.

The government of DIY then established Perda No. 3/1984 as a follow-up legal mechanism to the Keppres. The third article of the Perda states several old provisions on the autonomy of DIY swapraja (self-governing) regions pertaining to their land. These provisions originated from the era of Dutch colonialism. The provisions were Rijksblaad Kasultanan No. 16 and 18 Tahun 1989, Rijksblaad Kasultanan No. 11 Tahun 1928 jo. 1931 No. 2 and Rijksblaad Paku Alaman No. 13 Tahun 1928 jo. No. 1 / 1931, Rijksblaad Kasultanan No. 23 Tahun 1925, and Rijskblad Paku Alaman No. 25 Tahun 1925 (Kusumoharyono 2006; Antoro 2013). However, according to the Ministry of Home Affairs, through the passing of Ministerial Decree of Home Affairs (Keputusan Menteri Dalam Negeri) No. 66/1984, the full enactment of the UUPA 1960 in DIY was to be implemented gradually (Huda 2000).
The enactment of the UUPA in DIY did not result in the unifying of agrarian laws in the period after 1984. After the central government established Law No. 13/2012 on Yogyakarta’s Special Status (Undang-Undang Keistimewaan Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta- UUK), the government of DIY formulated Perdais Yogyakarta No. 1/2013 (Yogyakarta Special Law), which fundamentally legitimizes a feudal dominant system over swapraja land by the Kasultanan and Kadipaten. The Kasultanan and Kadipaten were then given status as legal entities (Sari, Silviana, and Prasetyo 2016). The formulation of UUK began on May 10, 2012, when Sri Sultan HB X announced Sabdatama as the highest law in DIY, parallel to the constitution. These types of laws were rarely made by the previous sultans unless it was deemed necessary to overcome severe social conditions in DIY, such as what Sri Sultan HB IX did to resolve turmoil just after the country’s independence.

Shortly after, the UUK No. 13/2012 was established on August 31, 2012. The formulation of the UUK draft began in 2000 and was proposed to the central government to be discussed by the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) in 2002. However, because DIY was not a province with issues linked to separatism, the UUK draft did not receive positive feedback from the central government (Bhakti 2010). It was only in 2010, during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s term, that the UUK draft was reproposed to the central government. The reproposal was not without its pros and cons, as the president initially expressed his hesitance to recognize the “sovereignty” of DIY (Wahyu 2018).

In comparison to other swapraja (self-governing) areas, Kasultanan and Pakualaman Yogyakarta were able to take advantage of political opportunities in every rotation of political power in Indonesia. Both took part in national movements and held important positions in the formal political sphere, so they were able to maintain their influence at the national and local levels (Antoro 2015). One of those roles is Sri Sultan HB IX’s willingness to provide protection to several of the country’s political leaders and lend his land as the country’s emergency capital city during the country’s fight for independence (Bhakti 2010). These
political contributions gave DIY a relatively strong influence over the central government’s decision to maintain its special status.

The elitist character of the effort to maintain DIY’s traditional political rule was demonstrated during the sultanate’s fight for the UUK. The circulation of the draft among officials was minimal and often only involved local officials, such as the heads of villages (Pranoto 2017). The institutionalization of UU Keistimewaan was also supported by several arguments (Antoro 2017). The first argument pertained to history, stating that the palace—which consists of the Kasultanan and Pakualaman—was a sovereign political entity before Indonesia gained its independence. The second argument was that the special status of the Kasultanan and Pakualaman’s rights and authority was not regulated by Indonesian law, which indicated a vacuum of power especially in regard to the matters of land. Third was the political argument that the revitalization of the UUPA is needed to accommodate swapraja (self-government) land rights (Antoro 2017).

To exercise its special status and rights, the DIY provincial government receives annual funding from the national budget (APBN), which increases each year. In contrast to Otsus (special autonomy), this funding does not have a time limit and will be continuously granted as long as the region’s special status is recognized by the central government. Regarding land governance, special funds were also allocated to the certification of the palace’s estate, as stated in Rijksblad Kasultanan Yogyakarta No. 16 Tahun 1918 and Rijksblad Pakualaman No. 18 Tahun 1918. In its execution, matters pertaining to the sultanate’s lands are often difficult as the Kasultanan and Pakualaman, as legal entities, are untouched by the audit on wealth and obligation of taxation (Idhom 2017).

Essentially, the agrarian political context in DIY today is not the fault of its governance, but rather of the design of the country’s development layout from the colonial era until today (Pranoto 2017). The region’s agrarian political context is shaped by the convergence of the statist land rule system and neocustomary system, where the state also indirectly rules the region by strengthening the traditional elites
through the granting of autonomy (Pranoto 2017). This indirect rule by the state complements the state’s position as the sole authority over lands recognized by the constitution and the state’s legal provisions.

In its course of development, the state can control village residents through eviction (Pranoto 2017). This condition is made possible through the country’s acceptance of various laws during the colonial era, where the plurality of legal frameworks was taken as part of the Indonesian society’s authenticity. The people, especially those in rural areas, are usually not aware that the plurality of legal frameworks tends to benefit the elites (Pranoto 2017).

Studies in the field of political economy have demonstrated that the political authorities of the palace elites in UU Keistimewaan facilitate the Kasultanan and Kadipaten’s domination in various sectors, including control over land, decision-making pertaining to spatial governance and function, circulation of investment, and control over institutions and local governance (Subektie 2018). This domination of land ownership is often brought up in debates on the resilience of the monarchy and oligarchy in the country’s democracy. UU Keistimewaan provides legal justification for the government of DIY in the making of several policies, such as the certification of land in SG and PAG, transfers of land title to the palace, and temporary termination of extensions of usage rights and building rights for state-owned lands (Gerakan Masyarakat Penerus Amanat Sultan HB IX 2015).

Land certification processes are usually accompanied by the acquisition and seizure of land by the Kadipaten Pakualaman and Kasultanan DIY elites. Sri Sultan HB X has repeatedly emphasized the legalization of SG and PAG through UU Keistimewaan (Aditjondro 2011). A number of regulations have also been enacted to legitimize SG and PAG, such as DIY Gubernatorial Regulation No. 112/2014 on the Utilization of Village Land, Perdais No. 2/2017 on the Spatial Planning of Kasultanan’s and Kadipaten’s Land, and Perdais No. 1/2017 on the Management and Utilization of Kasultanan’s and Kadipaten’s Land (Subektie 2018).

The UUK was often claimed to preserve the legal contradiction between the colonial land laws, Rijksblad Kasultanan Yogyakarta No.
16 Tahun 1918 and Rijksblad Pakualaman No. 18 Tahun 1918, and the UUPA 1960. The claim is based on the returning of lands previously owned by the people as stipulated in the UUPA 1960 to the ownership of the Kasultanan (SG) and Kadipaten Pakualaman (PAG) (Goldie 2018). After their eviction, the people only have rights to the lease or use of the land, usually known as magersari. The palace may take away the land whenever it wishes. This condition will create unfair and undemocratic political-economic relations, as well as decrease people’s access to land (Idhom 2017).

These socioeconomic realities indicate that the political economy of the UUK along with its legal derivatives are a manifestation of the Kasultanan and Pakualaman’s efforts to reorganize the colonial character of swapraja by securing their positions as governors from generation to generation (Antoro 2016). The consequences of these practices are often ignored due to the many justifications made to dismiss them. One of those justifications is that the swapraja is no different from customary communities that are subject to customary laws. Kasultanan and Kadipaten Pakualaman perceive SG and PAS as tanah ulayat, or customary land, excluding them from the jurisdiction of the UUPA. These claims have received challenges from academic studies that showed the differences between customary laws and swapraja (Antoro 2015).

One of the harmful political-economic implications of this political-economic reality for people is the liberalization of land utilization that involves landlords and investors through Surat kekancingan. Panitikismo, the institution that manages the land matters of the palace, can issue Surat kekancingan to accommodate the interests of investors regarding SG land (Suroatmojo 2017). The BPN (Badan Pertanahan Nasional/National Land Agency) of DIY has issued building rights that strengthen the Pakualaman’s ownership claim and legitimized the Kadipaten’s authority to transfer financial compensation through consignation to village residents whose lands were confiscated.

Data from 2014 demonstrates that the most extensive areas of SG and PAG are located in Kabupaten Kulon Progo, and these areas cover 26,451,247 ha, or 52.24% of total SG and PAG lands (Hasim 2016). Cur-
rently, the areas of PAG are more dominant (Aditjondro 2011). These areas will expand along with the inventory and certification of SG and PAG in reference to the original of 1838 and the national budget. Since the enactment of MP3EI in 2011, DIY has become the destination of increasing capital and investment. In 2010, the investment amounted to IDR4.3 trillion; the number increased to IDR7.75 trillion in 2012 (Yogyakarta 2016). This development shows how the DIY’s special status, under the guise of regional autonomy in the UUK, was not a matter of governance and administration, but rather the reorganization of oligarchic power and the Kasultanan Yogyakarta elite domination over agrarian rule. This premise is emboldened by the fact that the royal family’s business networks have control over a large number of companies from various sectors and influence over the appointment of royal family members in DIY’s social, economic, and political institutions (Aditjondro 2011).

The power of the Kasultanan and Pakualaman’s claim over SG and PAG was shown at the national conciliation FGD forum held by the National Commission on Human Rights of Indonesia (Komnas HAM) in November 11–14, 2015, which invited academicians and the governor of DIY. When asked about the conflicts occurring on SG and PAG lands, the governor of DIY—represented by the head of Panitikismo KGPH Hadiwinoto—stated that the residents involved in the conflict did not have any rights over the lands. He accused the residents of purposefully building and developing property unlawfully to claim rights to compensation (Afandi 2016; Riyadi 2016). The political-economic interests of the elites were also apparent as the two types of land became a source of income through shares of Hotel Ambarukmo, Ambarukmo Plaza, Saphier Square, and Padang Golf Merapi (Aditjondro 2011).

The enactment of the UUK has fostered many agrarian conflicts in DIY, including the NYIA construction dispute. LBH Yogyakarta reported that in 2015, there was a rising trend in human rights violations pertaining to the right to work and proper living. This trend was attributed to UUK DIY. This fact is in line with the FKMA’s record that shows that since the enactment of UU Keistimewaan, the num-
ber of agrarian conflicts in DIY has significantly increased along with the emergence of activism to oppose the domination of SG and PAG ownership.

**Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta in the vortex of agrarian conflicts**

Based on data from BPS, the poverty rate in DIY is above the national average, while inequality in DIY reached 0.43% in March 2017. The percentage was higher than the national inequality rate, which was 0.39%, and placed DIY at the second rank after Papua (Himawan 2017). One of the factors behind this poor economic condition was the domination and management of land as means of production and control over its utilization, which often results in vertical agrarian conflicts (Subektie 2018). After the reform era, there were around 24 agrarian conflicts in DIY.

**Conflict over the Construction of the NYIA Megaproject in Temon District, Kulon Progo Regency in 2012–2018**

In *Organization Conflict: Concept and Models*, Louis R. Pondy discusses conflicts in terms of five stages. The first stage is the latent conflict stage (condition), which is marked by the emergence of conflict drivers. Second is the perceived conflict stage where a party or actor perceives the other as a threat. Third is the felt conflict stage, where a party fully realizes the imbalance of power or position between them and the other parties. Fourth is the manifest conflict stage, where two parties engage in open confrontation, such as demonstrations, sabotage, and boycott. Fifth is the conflict aftermath stage, which consists of two possibilities: (a) the formulation of conflict resolution to accommodate the parties involved or (b) the escalation of conflict (Pondy 1967).

In the context of the NYIA megaproject conflict, the latent conflict stage began with the signing of a memorandum of understanding between PT Angkasa Pura I (AP I) and the Indian investment company GVK Power and Infrastructure on January 25, 2011. The construction
project was designed through a public–private partnership that involved foreign investors, without support from the national budget during its construction phase (Suharjono 2017). On May 11, the government of DIY, represented by Sri Sultan HB X, signed an memorandum of understanding with PT AP I, represented by Tommy Soetomo, director of Gedung Pracimosono, Kepatihan Complex. On May 13, the coast of Temon District, Kulon Progo was set as the destination for the translocation of Bandara Adisucipto, which has an area of 637 ha and covers six villages. The felt conflict stage was marked by the formation of the WTT (Wahana Tri Tunggal) as an organization of collective opposition to the site’s construction on September 9, 2012. The organization comprises the residents as well as farmers impacted by the construction. The number of the organization’s members was estimated at 11,501 residents from 2,875 family units and six villages impacted.

The Dynamics of Vertical Conflict: Physical Violence, Intimidation, Human Rights Violations, and Criminalization

The manifest conflict stage of the NYIA megaproject conflict was dynamic and accompanied by other events that contributed to the escalation of conflict. The conflict at this stage did not occur immediately, as it was preceded by several triggers that may be categorized as latent conflicts. The WTT consolidated itself with other grass-roots organizations, such as the PPLP (Paguyuban Petani Lahan Pantai), a grass-roots organization whose main agenda is to oppose the mining of iron sand and the building of steel mills. Each year, the number of WTT members has declined. In November 2016, the WTT had 300 family units as its members, but before 2016, the organization had 600 (Reza 2016). The decline in these numbers can be attributed to the approaches employed by PT AP I and village officials. On April 16, 2017, the WTT formed the Paguyuban Warga Penolak Penggusuran Kulon Progo (PWPP-KP) in Glagah Village as a response to the declining number of their members. The formation of the PWPP-KP involved an estimated 300 people from eighty-six family units (Rimbawana 2017).
The formation of the PWPP-KP indicated the conflict’s shift to the *conflict aftermath* stage. This stage occurred when the structural violence employed by the authorities was not sufficient to smooth the agenda of land clearing, which began on November 27, 2017. The land clearing started after President Joko Widodo issued Presidential Regulation No. 98/2017 on Acceleration of Airport Development and Operation in Kulon Progo on October 23, 2017. Opposition came from university students, workers, farmers from various regions in the country and (tergabung) *Forum Sekolah Bersama* (Sekber), *Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Agraris*, GESTOP BYIA, and other NGOs (Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Agraria (FKMA) 2018). To ease the eviction process, PT AP I along with PT PLN cut the electricity supply in the area on November 27–29, 2017. The eviction was accompanied by physical violence, intimidation, criminalization, and the detention of volunteers and activists by PT AT, PT PP, and PT SKS. The authorities involved included 400 municipal police personnel, police, the military, and civil officers. The authorities employed repressive measures, such as breaking down doors, demolishing places of worship, and barring residents from entering their homes (Putusanra 2017).

During the land clearing on December 5, 2017, an artist who was part of the *Aliansi Warga Tolak Bandara*, Hermanto, was injured because of being dragged by the authorities and hit by stones when he attempted to prevent his art studio from being demolished by an excavator. Hermanto said that he never signed any land sale agreements and or consignment (Edi 2017). Fajar, Hermanto’s brother, was strangled and dragged by the authorities as well, when he tried to protect his backyard. In addition to the destruction of property and homes, the December 5 eviction also involved the arrest of twelve activists on the charge of provocation (Ratnasari 2017).

**The horizontal conflict between residents**

Besides the internal conflict within the WTT, the formation of Ge mas NYIA, MPK, and FRWT (Forum Rembug Warga Transparansi) as competing grass-roots organizations that support the construction
of the NYIA also became a source of horizontal conflict between the residents who were impacted. According to the WTT, two organizations were formed by the government of Kulon Progo on April 14, 2014, to generate support for the construction of the NYIA. Days after their formation, these groups made banners expressing their support for the project. This bipolarization of stances eroded the social cohesion and solidarity of the local community. An example of horizontal conflict is the ripping and confiscation of banners showing support for the NYIA construction on April 30, 2014 (Subandar 2014).

Residents who had previously lived and worked together harmoniously, through their farming activities, grew hostile toward each other because of these different perspectives. One of those impacted is Kelik Martono, who has cut off all communication with members of his family who support the construction (Ibrahim 2017). The residents in support of the construction of the NYIA demanded the speeding up of the project as they perceived the project to be in accordance with the laws (Interview with Sri Mulyanto, December 20, 2018). They viewed the activists, especially university students and the campus press, as provocateurs behind the opposition to the construction.

DRIVERS OF THE NYIA MEGAPROJECT CONFLICT

Elitist decision-making

In the eyes of the central government, the construction of the NYIA was a manifestation of their ambition to build an aerotropolis—a city that has its spatial layout, economic sector, and infrastructure centred around the airport. Aerotropolises are built to drive the growth of the economy through the construction of complementary sites or zones, such as shopping areas, culinary sites, hotels, business districts, cultural sites, and tourism destinations. The existence of an airport also drives the development of other infrastructure, such as highways and railroads. The downside of this concept is that local small and medium enterprises will become marginalized, as the flow of profit will be exclusive to transnational companies (Rose 2015).
Politically, the NYIA was designed through an MP3EI policy scheme during the administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Ahmad 2018). The scheme designs systems of connectivity and economic zonation of each region; through this scheme, Yogyakarta was designed to be a region built on the meeting, incentive, convention, and exhibition (MICE) concept. Fundamentally, the MP3EI was based on an Asian free-market framework, the Comprehensive Asian Development Bank (CADP). The framework was formulated by the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN, an Asian economic think-tank, in 2010. The combination of the pressure to overcome the 2008 economic crisis and the ambition for economic growth in Asia became the justification behind the formulation of the CADP. This scheme has a high chance of shifting the function of infrastructure from being the provider of public service for the people to an area of business serving industrial interests (Rachman 2014).

The MP3EI was then adopted in the formulation of the National Medium-Term Development Plan (Rancangan Pembangunan Jangka Menengah Nasional) for 2015–2019, under the Joko Widodo administration. The framework sets Yogyakarta as an area of service and tourism. However, the NYIA project was not part of the RPJMN, as cited in the Deputy for Facilities and Infrastructure of Bappenas’s document presented in Ambon in December 2014. The Ministry of Tourism’s financial report in 2016 showed an increase in foreign tourist arrivals—12.1 million arrivals—or 100.2% from the initial target and 15.54% more than that of the previous year. Amid the decreasing revenue from the coal, palm oil, and oil and gas trades, these foreign tourist arrivals were able to contribute IDR176–184 trillion to the country from its initial target of 172 trillion. As a response to this achievement, the Ministry of Tourism targeted to attract 17 million foreign tourists to the country in 2018, higher than the previous year’s target, which was set at 10.46 million (Kementerian Pariwisata 2017).

To meet that target, in May 2016, Minister of Tourism Arief Yahya allocated a budget of USD755.5 million to tourism infrastructure, which included eleven priority destinations equivalent to Dewata Island.
Those eleven priority destinations were then narrowed down to three in November 2016: Lake Toba, Mandalika, and Borobudur (Bridger 2017). Similar to the central government, the government of DIY and the government of Kulon Progo Regency’s policy orientation is influenced by economic considerations, especially the tourism sector. To them, the NYIA is deemed necessary to replace Adisucipto Airport, which has limited capacity and is impossible to expand further. Since 2013, there has been a surge in the number of passengers, which reached 2 million, while the area of Adisucipto Airport’s terminal is 15,000 square meters and is built to accommodate only 1.2 million passengers per year (Putera 2018).

Air traffic has also increased each year; in 2016, the number reached 53,752 and in 2017, the number was 57,677, with an average increase rate of 7.30% (Sikumbang 2018). According to Agus Pandu Purnama, PT AP I general manager for Adisucipto Airport, this situation limits the movement of passengers in the airport. This infrastructural capacity limitation is predicted to result in a low occupancy rate of hotels in Yogyakarta, which only reached 50% despite the many foreign airlines that take direct flight routes to Yogyakarta (Sikumbang 2018).

The government of DIY’s support for the development of the urban area is reflected in the opening of investment opportunities in the rapidly growing property and hospitality sector. Data shows that the increase in the number of hotels in Yogyakarta has a significant positive correlation with the increase in tourist arrivals. Data from Dinas Pariwisata Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta shows a 263% surge in the region’s number of hotels and 283% in the number of tourist arrivals, both foreign and domestic, over the course of five years (Dinas Pariwisata 2017). The increase in the number of hotels resulted in competition within the hospitality industry.

To prevent market saturation, as an interest group in the hospitality industry, PHRI recommended government direct investment in Kabupaten Gunungkidul, Bantul, and Kulon Progo. Out of the three regions, Kabupaten Kulon Progo became a priority destination. The main consideration behind this decision was the NYIA megaproject (Linangkung
Thus, it was inevitable that the property and hospitality sector became the most popular target of investment in Kabupaten Kulonprogo (DPMPT Kulon Progo 2019).

Based on a study conducted by Tim Persiapan Pembangunan Bandara Baru (P2B2), one of the reasons behind the opposition to the construction of the NYIA was ambiguity and a lack of consensus regarding the compensation for the residents' lands (Rizqiyyah 2017). The mechanism of compensation through consignation was deemed harmful and unaccommodating to the residents who opposed the construction of the NYIA. The residents who objected to the construction of the NYIA perceived the compensation as a form of unfair and biased transaction. According to Presidential Regulation No. 71/2012, consignation is a mechanism of compensation for parties who agree to relinquish the rights to their land. Therefore, negotiation and consensus should emphasize compensation instead of whether the lands in question are to be sold (Saluang 2018). The negotiations that emphasized the latter led the residents who opposed the construction also to oppose the procedure of consignation.

This condition opened up room for other problems, such as negative “improvisation” by officials to meet the construction target. The pressure from the central government to speed up the construction prompted officials to use repressive means to clear the lands, such as terror, force, and intimidation. The use of such measures was accompanied by framing of residents who refused to sell their lands, where they were framed as though they were protesting their compensation (Saluang 2018). According to the PWPP-KP, the government of Kulon Progo, the vice head of the Wates Court and PT AP I acted as though the process of consignation was still ongoing despite the procedure being under investigation by Ombudsman DIY due to an indication of maladministration (PWPP-KP 2018).

Acts of intimidation and terror in the name of consignation during the process of land clearing were carried out starting on November 27, 2017. Police officials took down the electric meters of the houses of residents who refused to give up their land. The residents repeat-
edly demanded warrants and letters of assignment for the land clearing but were ignored by the authorities. Furthermore, the authorities destroyed the houses of residents who had not received compensation before those who had. On December 4, a clash took place between the residents and officials, as well as the arrest of twelve students who were accused of provocation (Savitri et al. 2018). An investigation conducted by Ombudsman DIY discovered that the police were involved in the land clearing, the destruction of building and electric meters, and the cutting of the electricity supply. The investigation suggested that there was a conduct of maladministration as the police seemed to assume the role and position of PT AP I rather than as officers whose main responsibility is to maintain the protection and safety of the people (Pertana 2017).

The PWPP-KP’s course to reject the consignation system was supported by LBH Yogyakarta as the mechanism aimed to confiscate property unilaterally without the consent of the people. The law stipulates that the system of compensation can be conducted through consignation under the condition that (1) the landowner rejects the compensation or decision made by the court, or (2) the land in question is a matter of a legal problem or dispute. The consequence of the mechanism was that the parties who consistently rejected the land clearing were deemed “to have lost the battle” as the mechanism involved the estimation of the value of the property and forced the residents to give up their rights over their lands (Resnanto 2017).

Ideally, consignation is conducted when the whereabouts of the party involved is unknown or when the ownership of the land is an object of legal dispute. These conditions were not met in the case of the NYIA conflict (Aziz 2017). Furthermore, Law No. 2/2012 Article 36 Clause 3 stipulates that the compensation should be agreed upon by both parties. In reality, this mechanism of consignation created a “new alternative” for residents who rejected the construction of the NYIA, where they were forced to request a “re-estimation” of the value of their land when their opposition to the land clearing was deemed unlawful.
Kadipaten Pakualaman, as deputy to the governor of DIY, dominated the ownership of the land impacted by the construction: an area of 160 ha, or 27% of the total land needed for the site’s construction (Permana 2017). The legality of the ownership is based on UU Keis-timewaan DIY, which contained provisions from Rijskblad Pakualaman Tahun 1918, that was enacted during the Dutch colonial era. To the residents who opposed the NYIA construction, as well as the intellectual groups and NGOs supporting them, the law was abolished when the UUPA was fully enacted in DIY, although the residents who managed and cultivated the lands in PAG—through the building and creation of property, fish farms, or agriculture—did not possess land titles (Goldie 2018).

Residents who joined PKPLP, a group consisting of farmers and cultivators in PAG, had to release their land with a compensation that was miniscule compared to the profit that Pakualaman obtained, which reached IDR702 billion from the total of IDR727 billion. The PKPLP demanded compensation of one-third to one-half of the total profit received by Pakualaman. Pakualaman rejected the request and chose to provide compensation in the form of the tali asih program, or expression of gratitude. The FKPLP felt that they played a significant role in the cultivation of Pakualaman land, which contributed to the region’s agrarian productivity. The FKPLP finally received financial compensation of IDR25 billion through the Pakualaman’s instruction to Regent of Kulon Progo, Hasto Wardoyo in late October 2017 (Jati 2017).

**Governance driver of conflict: Lack of dialogue and consultation between the community and PT AP I**

This problem was reflected in the process of consignation, where the lands of the residents who opposed the construction were entrusted to the Wates Court. As a result, the residents lost their normative rights to their land despite their possession of certificates, girik, or other proof of ownership. The residents also refused to fulfill consignation summonses from the court, claiming that they never submitted proof of ownership to the court and that there was an absence of land valuation. The resi-
dents also did not attend public consultations or negotiations pertaining to land transactions with PT AP I (Aziz 2017). This issue underlay the demonstration opposing the consignment that took place in the court’s yard on March 2, 2017 (Widiyanto 2017).

Initially, the WTT refused to attend the public consultation regarding the construction of the NYIA. The head of the WTT said that residents unconditionally refused to compromise. However, on September 23, 2014, the organization decided to attend the third public consultation—those who did not come were even assumed to support the construction. The WTT planned to attend the public consultation with a formal invitation. However, security officers prevented their arrival without explanation (Putri and Astarina 2015). The secretary of PT AP I claimed that the measure was taken in anticipation of the WTT’s protests, which might result in other invitees not coming (Ibrahim 2017). When the IPL was issued, only 10% of residents (consisting of civil servants, military, and police personnel) agreed to the construction, while 60% refused (farmers) and the remaining others refused to state their stance (Imelda 2017). Public consultations were conducted several times, but the dialogues with the WTT were not conducive and participative. The consultation on March 3, 2015, did not invite 50 WTT members who owned land in the area. A similar situation happened during the February 26, 2015, consultation and the November 10, 2016, discussion on the assessment of environmental impacts (Amdal). The consultations only involved residents who supported the construction, who were also selected by their head of villages. The WTT said that this measure was taken to ensure the formulation of an environmental impact assessment (Amdal) that served the interests of the government and PT AP I (Imelda 2017).

Social driver of conflict: Perception of harms

The P2B2 and PT AP I team said that there are several reasons underlay the residents’ opposition to the construction of the NYIA (Rizqiyyah 2017). First, the residents were reluctant to hand over their land to begin with. Second, the lands had been passed down from generation to
generation. This argument was often used by the residents, despite their being offered a large sum of money—up to billions—to compensate them for their land. Third, the residents were content with their farming livelihoods. Fourth, uncertainty surrounded the residents’ business enterprises. Fifth, for the members of WTT, the areas of land in question were their main means of production, which had contributed to the development of the area’s agrarian economy through the residents’ labor and farm produce. To them, the construction of the NYIA would reduce their productivity because of the decrease in land capability; 300 ha, or almost half of the construction site, is comprised of arable—both wet and dry—land (Amin 2018).

It was estimated that around 148,000 farmers would lose their livelihoods that depended on the production of eggplant, squash, watermelons, melons, and chilies. From every hectare, the farmers were able to harvest an average of 60 tons of squash, 180 tons of melons, 90 tons of watermelons, 90 tons of eggplant, and 30 tons of chilies (Niam 2017). Furthermore, the production of rice was also predicted to wane to around 6 tons per ha each year because of the clearing of 100.37 ha of rice fields (Evani 2018). The Perda No. 2/2010 Article 51 Point G stipulates that the region of Kabupaten Kulon Progo is protected farming land, both its wet and dry lands. According to data from BPS, Yogyakarta, Indonesia, Kabupaten Kulon Progo consisted of productive farming land that made up one of the main providers of food in DIY (Ahmad 2018). The construction of the NYIA was proven to result in the rise in food insecurity in Kecamatan Temon, from 87 to 90% in 2018 (Nurpita, Wihastuti, and Andjani 2018).

The construction of the NYIA also threatened the region’s cultural heritage. Those cultural heritage sites include Stupa Glagah, Arca Perunggu Amonghasidhi dan Vajrapani, Batu Bata Besar, Lumpang Batu, Makam Mbah Drajat, Situs Petilasan Gunung Lanang and Gunung Putri, and Batu Besar Eyang Gadhung Mlati. These sites are legally protected in the DIY Gubernatorial Regulation No. 62/2013 on the Preservation of Cultural Heritage (PWPP-KP 2018).
CONCLUSION

Based on the discussion above, the author concludes that the conflict related to the construction of the NYIA megaproject was caused by at least three main drivers: (a) elitist-based interests, (b) governance driver of conflict, and (c) social driver of conflict. The premise for elite-based interests is founded on two main arguments and field findings, which are (a) the economic argument about the pressure for the growth of the tourism industry, and (b) the political argument on the domination of land ownership by elites in DIY and its preservation through Law No. 13/2012. At least two arguments explain the elitist policy-making in the construction of the NYIA megaproject: the economic and the political argument. The economic argument revolves around the convergence of local and national elites’ interests shaped by pressure for the economic growth of the tourism industry. The political argument explains how the domination of land ownership by Kadipaten Pakualaman continued to be legitimized through Presidential Regulation No. 71/2012 and Law No. 2/2012, which legitimize the confiscating nature and unilateral procedure of consignation.

Based on Molotch’s (1976) theory on elite-based interests in urban development, the economic argument concerns the pressure for tourism growth, both from the regional and the national government. The political argument is built on the domination of land ownership by palace elites (Kadipaten Pakualaman and Kasultanan) that is legitimized by UUK DIY and other special regional laws, as well as the arrangement of unfair compensation through consignation. Another factor that contributed to the conflict is the lack of consultation between the residents impacted by the construction and PT AP I as the executor of the project. Along with the minimum compensation given to the residents impacted by the construction, these problems make up the governance and social drivers of conflict.
REFERENCES


sistem-konsinyasi-pembebasan-lahan-bandara-yogya-rugikan-masyarakat-cA8E


gar-dirobohkan-paksa-karena-pembangunan-bandara-kulon-progo.html
Interview With Sri Mulyanto (Local Resident in Kulon Progo). 20 December 2018.


ate Thesis. Airlangga University, Surabaya. http://repository.unair.ac.id/70608/


