Examining Pancasila’s Position in the Public Reason Scheme: A Critical Analysis

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ABSTRAK
Tulisan ini mencoba untuk mengkaji ulang sejumlah gagasan dari beberapa sarjana dan intelektual Indonesia, seperti Yudi Latif, Franz Magnis-Suseno dan Syamsul Ma’arif, yang melihat dan menggambarkan relasi antara Pancasila dengan public reason, salah satu konsep politik yang cukup populer dalam studi politik. Sejumlah sarjana dan intelektual Indonesia tersebut membingkai Pancasila dengan public reason dalam gambaran yang bernuansa sekuler sehingga berpotensi melepaskan kontribusi dari yang seharusnya dapat dilakukan oleh agama. Turunan dari public reason yang bermasalah tersebut di antaranya (1) prinsip negasi terhadap mayoritarianisme, (2) prinsip negara netral, dan (3) prinsip substantsial dalam agama (universalisme). Dengan penelaahan kualitatif yang merujuk pada sejumlah argumen baik filosofis maupun historis, maka dapat ditunjukkan bahwa argumen yang diberikan ketiga sarjana di atas beserta sejumlah lain yang mendukung dan memiliki gagasan serupa, dinilai memiliki sejumlah masalah. Kemudian dari penelaahan tersebut, dapat disimpulkan bahwa pemikiran yang mendukung relasi Pancasila dengan public reason secara sekuler tidak kuat secara argumen dan tidak dipertahankan. Sehingga, relasi Pancasila dengan public reason bisa ditelaah ulang dengan konsep yang lebih ramah terhadap kontribusi agama.

Kata kunci: pancasila, public reason, mayoritarianisme, universalisme, negara netral

ABSTRACT
This research tries to review a number of ideas of some Indonesian scholars such as Yudi Latif, Franz Magnis-Suseno, and Syamsul Ma’arif, who saw and described the relationship between Pancasila and public reason, one of the popular political concepts in political studies. Some Indonesian scholars have linked Pancasila to public reason, with a secular nuance, so that it could potentially be free of religious associations. The troubled derivatives of public reason include (1) the negation of the principle of majoritarianism, (2) the neutral state principle, and (3) substantial elements in religion, such as the principle of universalism. With a qualitative study referring to a number of philosophical and historical arguments, it can be shown that the arguments given by the three aforementioned scholars, and others who share similar ideas, were considered to have a number of issues. From this review, it can be concluded that the thinking that supports the relationship between Pancasila and public reason is weak in terms of the secular argument. Therefore, the relation between Pancasila and public reason can be reviewed with more approachable ideas regarding religious contributions.

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INTRODUCTION

Debates regarding the meaning of Pancasila have gone through various stages of discussion. In the Soekarno era, these debates were related to the existence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which in many ways contributed to the interpretation of Pancasila. At that time, PKI was having an intense debate with Islamic groups represented by Masyumi and Nahdlatul Ulama. Both groups attacked each other through their different interpretations of the ideology of Pancasila. In the Soeharto era, there were hardly any debates on the meaning of Pancasila because the interpretation of the philosophy was almost completely monopolized by the authorities. Instead, there was a single interpretation of Pancasila. The Soeharto government even succeeded in forcing a number of Islamic mass organizations to accept Pancasila as their sole philosophy while forbidding other ideologies to be used.

Debates over the interpretation of Pancasila began to re-emerge in the reform era (reformasi), especially when the practice of democracy was adopted on a large scale. Consequently, this had an impact on both the arguments and ideas regarding the relationship between state and religion, including their inherent dynamics. These debates increasingly gained momentum when the House of Representatives (DPR) began discussions on the Law of Mass Organizations and presented some crucial articles, especially those that proposed Pancasila as the sole philosophy. The peak of the debate about Pancasila and its interpretation was when the government created a policy to “get rid of” the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia organization, which was thought to have a deviant understanding of Pancasila and was considered a threat to the existence of the state. In such an important time in history, the debates about Pancasila and its interpretation became important.

One important part of the interpretation of Pancasila that is often discussed by scholars and intellectuals is the concept of public reason initiated by John Rawls, which was later linked to Pancasila itself. The
notion of public reason is intriguing as this concept is quite famous among political theorists and state philosophers. It has been discussed and debated many times and has become an ideological battleground that challenges the minds of intellectuals. Moreover, a number of Indonesian scholars now often associate the concept of public reason with *Pancasila* in terms of the state ideology. The two emerged for relatively similar reasons, which were to bridge the social plurality that exists in the midst of a political community. Therefore, it is important to discuss and review the concept of public reason in terms of its connection to *Pancasila*.

However, trying to relate *Pancasila* to public reason, as a number of Indonesian scholars have done, is no simple matter. First, even though they share the same core concept, namely, diversity, public reason is actually a foreign principle that is not necessarily right to adapt because different social and historical conditions will come into conflict with this philosophy. Public reason comes from a Western tradition with a different social and historical background from that of Indonesia. Second, the characteristics of public reason tend to be skeptical and distanced from religion, whereas *Pancasila* is characterized by strong, explicit influences of religion. This indicates an incongruency (which of course must be proven) between the two ideas. This issue can provide the first step to reconsider the relation between *Pancasila* and public reason. Therefore, the author has developed two important questions in order to examine in more depth the relation between the two concepts: (1) How has the relationship between *Pancasila* and public reason been described by a number of Indonesian scholars? (2) Does the relation provide valid arguments?

The author argues that a number of scholars, such as Yudi Latif, Franz-Magnis Suseno, and Syamsul Ma’arif, have interpreted *Pancasila* in the framework of public reason with all its derivative forms (anti-majoritarianism, the neutral state, and universalism). However, public reason with its three derivative forms has problems that have implications for the validity of the relationship between *Pancasila* and public reason, which the author will discuss in more detail. These problems
have forced Indonesian scholars to think and act in a critical manner in terms of how the two concepts are related and how Pancasila is interpreted in terms of public reason.

RESEARCH METHOD

This study is divided into two parts. The first part describes a number of scholars who support and see Pancasila as having a strong relationship with public reason. The selected scholars include Yudi Latif, Franz Magnis-Suseno, and Syamsul Ma’arif. This section will examine how some Indonesian scholars constructed their arguments to justify the relationship between Pancasila and public reason. The second discussion will review and determine whether the arguments put forward by the aforementioned scholars do indeed show that there are strong relations between Pancasila and public reason. To analyze the train of thought of the scholars, philosophical and historical approaches are used. These approaches will also review the commonly existing derivatives of the idea of public reason, i.e., (1) the concept of the negation of majoritarianism, (2) the concept of a neutral state, and (3) the substantial principle of religion (universalism).

PUBLIC REASON AND PANCASILA: AN INTELLECTUAL PERSPECTIVE

The concept of public reason in the context of its true meaning had emerged long before Rawls used it. A number of classical political thinkers, such as Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant, are said to have referred to public reason as an important element in the study of political philosophy. Hobbes, for example, speaks of public reason in the context of an absolute state, with many disagreements about social conditions, particularly those regarding beliefs or religious doctrines. Such situations, for Hobbes, require an arbitrator to be an absolute mediator, which is the state. Here the state serves as the public reason that mediates conflicts or controversies. Yet the meaning of public reason here is far from the meaning used by modern political scholars, as public
reason falls under state absolutism, although initially Hobbes wanted to mediate the diversity of various religious beliefs within society. This is a similar situation to that of the emergence of the concept of public reason (Chambers 2009, 352–354).

Immanuel Kant, a scholar well known for the concept of the public use of reason, is considered to be the closest to the meaning of modern public reason. The core idea of the public use of reason is what makes an individual or community know how they should act. For Kant, the public use of reason is an idea that is distinct from the group and moves toward universalism. Thus, Kant directs public reason to the truth or reason produced through persuasion, arguments, and criticism, which all exist as a result of freedom. In other words, public reason arises in different ways when individuals are able to communicate and argue in a peaceful manner in order to reach mutually agreed resolutions (Chambers 2009, 363).

This idea developed by Kant was then utilized by Rawls to address questions and issues in diverse societies (Rawls 1996, 213–214). How are diverse communities able to maintain their stability, while diversity may create difficult conflicts? One of Rawls’s answers is with public reason. In general, Rawls is no different from Kant who divides reason into two major groups, namely, non-public reasoning and public reasoning. A policy or political decision can achieve legitimacy if such a policy is mutually acceptable and comprehensible. This cannot be fulfilled by non-public reasoning. Therefore, Rawls limits the role of non-public reasoning, which he calls a comprehensive doctrine. Through avoidance of non-public reasoning and by utilizing public reason, Rawls envisions a society that is stable and harmonious because the established policies are clear and acceptable to the public, as a result of the maximum avoidance of group logic (Sikka 2016, 94). It is as part of this framework that religious doctrine has no legitimacy because it is seen as partial, not comprehensible, and not universally accepted. Nevertheless,

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1 In Political Liberalism, Rawls acknowledges that the concept of public reason is not a new concept but an old one that has often been discussed by political philosophers, one of whom is Immanuel Kant.
Rawls adds an important point to his concept of public reason by providing a way for religion to exist in the public sphere as long as it provides a comprehensive doctrinal argument (one of which is religion) supported by the argument of public reason: a proviso (Sikka 2016, 94–95).

The issue of public reason has been tackled by thinkers such as Jürgen Habermas. Unlike Rawls, Habermas criticizes the proviso because he thinks that it does not satisfy religious groups. Therefore, he introduced the concept of a translation proviso. Here, religious arguments can become part of a formal institution (state) if pure religious language is adapted into an understandable language for the public. Religious doctrine is not immediately rejected, but embraced, so that it can become accessible to all members of a community, as it also potentially contains some truth. For Habermas, Rawls’s public reason is a Kantian form that does not support the formation of a pluralistic cosmopolitan society, especially for those who are less able to have a dialogue about religion (Redhead 2015, 87–88). However, Rawls’s proviso and Habermas’s translation proviso do not differ significantly (Sikka 2016, 95).

Henceforth, the concept of public reason became better known as one that seeks neutrality from elements that favor particular groups, such as religious doctrine. Kevin Vallier describes public reason as a concept that requires an action or established policy to be generally acceptable and understandable (accessible) and to be based on logical reasoning. Religion or religious doctrine is seen as an inaccessible argument (Vallier 2011, 366–368), so in the realm of public reason, religion often has no place. Why is that so? This is related to the fact that diversity in communities or societies is assumed to be a positive thing, but it can be different and even contradictory. To resolve this situation, the concept of public reason emerged as a solution.

A number of Indonesian scholars have discussed issues regarding the relationship between Pancasila and public reason. This indicates that the concept of public reason is seen as interesting and can be used as a kind of interpretation of the idea of Pancasila itself. Yudi Latif first discussed it in his book, “State of Plenary: Pancasila History, Rationality and Actuality.” He touched on this issue, particularly when he
discussed the idea of the first principle of *Pancasila*, Belief in the One and Only God. Latif writes that communities that interact with and participate in a joint political community can aspire to religious values, but when they enter an agreement, the next step is the process of public reason or public deliberation and not religious doctrine. This process is considered important, as public policy resulting from public reason or public deliberation is based on a rational, impartial attitude with broad participation and inclusive characters (Latif 2011, 109).

Before discussing public reason, Latif first highlighted the dichotomy surrounding the position of religion and the state. First, religion can be placed together with or fused with the state; this is commonly referred to as a theocracy or the state based on a particular religion. Another form of this concept is the existence of an official religion in a political community which is recognized as a reference for policies related to the public sphere. Second, a country can be very separatist in terms of the position of religion when dealing with the state. This kind of country is commonly referred to as a secular state that separates the role of religion from the state. Religious privatization is a compulsory song that must be sung in the style of a secular state. Therefore, such a country is not too concerned with religion, because it does not seem to have a formal influence or play an important role when the moving wheel of the state guides people’s lives. These two systems are not approved by Latif. He prefers a third path, neither fusion nor separation, but differentiation (Latif 2011, 97–109).

This option of differentiation then led Latif to become an intermediary concerning the issue of the position of religion and the state. But it seems that Latif adopted quite a lot of ideas from other figures such as Jose Casanova, Robert N. Bellah, and Alfred Stepan. The idea of differentiation was taken from Casanova, whereas from Bellah, Latif obviously derived the idea of civil religion. As for Stepan, it can be said that Latif took the idea of twin toleration.

When discussing the extent of how religion could relate to the state, Latif seemed to almost combine the ideas of the three intermediary thinkers. The idea of civil religion, borrowed from Bellah, emerged
when Latif described the proximity of *Pancasila* to the idea of civil religion, which could involve religious universalism and could be distinguished from religion. With this approach, religion is expected to be able to become the basis of the state’s political life in its spirit of moralism without making a particular religion the main reference (Latif, 2011, 110).

Casanova’s idea of differentiation became apparent when Latif asserted the rejection of the separation of religion from the state, but agreed with the differentiation between religious and state authorities (Latif 2011, 105–109). In this idea of differentiation, religious authority is described differently from state authority. Religious authority is no longer monopolistic and dominant, as religious institutions in the medieval West were. Now religion must deal with other institutions and even share authority and influence. Religion that was once dominant in many aspects, such as theology, economics, politics, and science, has now lost its dominance. This is what Casanova later termed differentiation (Knoblauch et al. 2011, 5 and Casanova 2008, 105).

Although this differentiation states that religion can lose its influence compared with what happened in the era of medieval Europe, religion and the public sphere are not totally separated. Religion can still play a role in the public sphere and can even influence the political state or community (Knoblauch et al. 2011, 14). This is also what Latif supported later because, for him, differentiation does not mean total separation or privatization of religion (Latif 2011, 107). Those are two things that Latif considered incompatible with the reality of life in almost all countries.

After establishing this concept of differentiation, Latif then strengthened it with the idea of twin toleration initiated by Alfred Stepan. Not much different from Casanova, Stepan was a political expert who also viewed secularization with the meaning of privatization or total separation between religion and the public sphere (in this context, the state), which has not been fully implemented in the practice of many Western countries. In other words, it is not entirely relevant. Stepan conducted a study of the constitution of Western countries and later concluded
that many Western countries (especially in the European region) did not fully carry out secularization in terms of the total separation of religion and state. A number of countries even have officially established churches such as Sweden, Denmark, Iceland, Finland, and Norway (Stepan and Linz 2013, 17). This argument is used by Latif who also wants to show that the separation and privatization of religion is no longer relevant.

Not only does Latif draw sociological conclusions and political facts, but he also provides a prescriptive interpretation that in order to maintain twin toleration, religious ideas must be inspirational, and they must undergo a process of public reason or public deliberation. Religious doctrine should not simply refer directly to the scriptures, but must have some substance, so as to fulfill rational and impartial requirements (Latif 2011, 109). This is what Latif meant by, “To make religion useful for democratic public life that must be brought to life is the ethical and prophetic mission of a universal religion, which is directed towards the realization of mutual benefit by fulfilling deliberative principles.” (Latif 2011, 120).

With this description, a logical flow of Latif’s view of Pancasila can be made by utilizing the concept of public reason. It starts by placing Pancasila as a civil religion that requires it not to be explored in the form of doctrinal or partial aspirations. At this level, all religions can meet, because they are considered to have the same universalistic spirit. The position of religion that plays a role in universal values is then synergized with the conception of differentiation that requires religion to not simply passively exist in the private domain without forging strong public relations, but rather requires it to also be active in the public sphere. However, the public sphere in question is more to do with the empowerment of civil society, the strengthening of society, the control of state absolutism, and the defense of the independence of others. Religion is not recommended to be too close to the state or included in the formulation of state policies. If it is “forced” to enter this process, it must develop through public reason or public deliberation that requires rationality and impartiality.
Second, we turn to Syamsul Ma’arif who wrote an article entitled “The Relation between Religion and Politics According to Rawls: Analysis of Pancasila as a Public Reason” (Ma’arif 2006). The style of thinking in Ma’arif’s article barely exceeded what was initiated by Rawls, starting from the reality of plural community, the original position (posisi azali), to public reason. These concepts were used by Ma’arif to research, analyze, and even solve state problems such as relations between religion and state and between groups of people.

Before arriving at public reason, Ma’arif first discussed Pancasila as a common ground as seen through the background of Indonesian people who are diverse in religions, tribes, and ethnicities. Moreover, the historical existence of Pancasila did emerge from a discussion by the founding fathers of Indonesia in the Investigating Committee for Preparatory work for Independence (BPUPKI) to reach an agreement regarding the basis of the country’s philosophy. At that time, some nationalists wanted a national state that was not based on religion, whereas Muslims wanted the foundation of the state to be Islamic. Then came the ideas of Sukarno’s Pancasila that were taken as the founding principles, and the Jakarta Charter was then formulated (Ma’arif 2006, 193).

The elimination of seven words in the Jakarta Charter, in Ma’arif’s view, was a reflection of the attitude of the founding fathers, especially those from the Islamic group, and this showed their decision toward the original position as initiated by Rawls. This attitude intended to negate interest biases, partial values, and attributes. This thinking behind the original position then implied that all residents with all their various social identities were in a free and equal position. More specifically, there was no majority dictatorship and minority tyranny. What existed was only a common interest that could only be understood together (Ma’arif 2006, 195).

What is interesting is that Ma’arif establishes public reason as a way of reaching common ground (Pancasila) by ignoring the multi-interpretative characteristics of Pancasila. All discourses such as Pancasila that exist in a diverse country must include public reason as their basis. Religious arguments cannot be incorporated as long as they have not
gone through the process of substantiation, extracting the substance from religious teachings that were previously not accepted as universal by other groups. The reason behind the absence of religion in public discourse is based on the diversity of groups in a community. This diversity requires that a certain comprehensive doctrine, religion, or philosophy may not necessarily be understood and accepted by others. With the medium of public reason, it is expected that the conditions of non-understanding and non-acceptability can be overcome so that political deadlock in plural societies can also be avoided (Ma’arif 2006, 197).

Third, Franz Magnis-Suseno also touched on the relation between Pancasila and John Rawls’s ideas, especially regarding overlapping consensus. In an article entitled “John Rawls, Justice and Pancasila,” Magnis-Suseno juxtaposes Pancasila as a national agreement initiated by a consensus of Rawls’s ideas around diverse or plural societies (Magnis-Suseno 2015, 172–173). This diverse society is a reasonable society, one in which people have the courage to sit together in order to abandon a comprehensive doctrine then find a way to reach an agreement between many parties. This is certainly different from an unreasonable group, a community group that imposes itself, lives only according to its own religious doctrine, but also wants other groups to carry out the same comprehensive doctrine. This situation then brought reasonable societies to a situation called the overlapping consensus (Magnis-Suseno 2015, 170).

After establishing that Pancasila is an overlapping consensus, it is not too difficult to find traces of public reason in Magnis-Suseno’s ideas in relation to Pancasila and groups in Indonesia, including religious groups. This is because public reason with overlapping consensus in the Rawlsian tradition is an almost inseparable package. It can even be said that public reason is a logical consequence of overlapping consensus. How is it possible to separate public reason from Rawlsian thought (including Franz Magnis-Suseno) if from the beginning this overlapping agreement requires neutral claims such as those made by Rawls?
Therefore, it is almost impossible to separate public reason from overlapping consensus, as evidenced by Magnis-Suseno’s logic. This evidence can be seen when Magnis-Suseno argued about the importance of neutrality and the loss of the comprehensive doctrine of certain religious groups as regards public policy. One example was when Magnis-Suseno did not agree with the implementation of a number of local regulations concerning obligations regarding clothing on certain days for religious reasons. For him, it was a violation of the Indonesian plurality concerning neutrality and diversity (Magnis-Suseno 2015, 150), a very Rawlsian thing. Even in executive, legislative, and judicial areas, religion is also not allowed to play a part. Religion and its institutions can only enter the public sphere that is related to civil society, not to the territory of the country.  

Magnis-Suseno does not agree with secularization in the context of religious privatization, where religion does not have an important role and influence in the public sphere. For Magnis-Suseno, what can be done is to reduce the influence of religion on state policy. Apparently, besides Rawls, the influence of Casanova and Habermas was felt in Magnis-Suseno’s ideas because they are opponents of the secularization theory in terms of religious privatization. Both think that the role of religion can be expanded and must not be narrowed to simply private spaces.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PUBLIC REASON AND PANCASILA AND ITS CRITICISM

When examined carefully, there are at least three conclusions that can be drawn from the views of the above scholars regarding the consequences of the concept of public reason. Furthermore, the consequences become a kind of mandatory axiom that has implications in providing a basis for the interpretation of Pancasila. Here, the relation

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2 For further details, see the interview results with Franz Magnis-Suseno summarized in Conversation with Franz Magnis-Suseno pp. 8–10. Accessible at http://nurcholishmadjid.org/assets/pdf/pengaruh/Percakapan-dengan-Franz-Magnis-Suseno.pdf (accessed on 22 December 2018).
between Pancasila and public reason can be evidenced in the views of the three scholars cited above.

First is the concept of negating majoritarianism. Supporters of public reason have become almost totally opposed to the idea of majoritarianism. Majoritarianism is interpreted as a socio-political identity that is embedded in or pinned to a community group that then totally dominates and thus can be distinguished from other community groups. The early initiators of public reason, such as Rawls and Habermas, were quite skeptical about majoritarianism in the life of the political identity of the nation. This is evident from the attitude of those who do not base themselves in certain comprehensive doctrines (religious or philosophical doctrines) and prefer other paths that are seen to accommodate diversity (Bailey and Gentile 2015, 4–11).

In a plural society, which has become Rawls’s vision, the big idea of political liberalism (including original position, overlapping consensus, and public reason) is clearly a concept that does not have room for majoritarianism. This concept does not allow for a society with a single identity that has its own conception of goodness that is then applied or even forced into the body of the political community as a whole. In contrast, what happens is that society is organized freely and equally without being based on the concept of the majority–minority (Koppelman 2017, 289–290). Rawls had the idea to form such a society because in a political community, society has become so diverse that it then challenges life’s stability and harmony. It is no wonder then that the question arises of how to make the community stable in the midst of this diversity.

In the effort to create a stable society in the midst of this diversity, there also exists skepticism and there is an almost self-evident conclusion that majoritarianism will lead to something bad. This is what Latif, Ma’arif, and Magnis-Suseno all think. All three imagine a situation where majoritarianism will cause injustice, authoritarianism, and oppression. Latif said that the representation of one religious group can have a negative impact in terms of a decline in the plurality of nationalities, which is one of the Indonesian characteristics. Majori-
tarianism is associated with a religious state, so a brief conclusion can be reached that states that every instance of majoritarianism, in the context of Pancasila, will always be directly proportional to the Islamic state (Latif 2011, 111).

Magnis-Suseno also gave a not very positive description of majoritarianism by stating that partiality toward a group through a policy is seen as being partial to an exclusive ideology that must be avoided and is contrary to the diversity of the nation. An example is the wearing of certain religious clothing that exists in a number of local regulations (Magnis-Suseno 2015, 150). Such a description of majoritarianism is not actually separated from the problems that should have been resolved in the first place so that the conclusions and descriptions used are more appropriate, or at least majoritarianism can be put in its place. Some of these problems include historical bias, different facts according to various political thinkers, and interpretations of the nation’s founders (originalism).

Concerns about majoritarianism can actually be said to contain historical biases that may not necessarily be justified as different historicity. This is because the majoritarianism that is promoted by thinkers and intellectuals is often related to traumatic Western historicity regarding dark medieval situations. Therefore, it is not surprising that the intellectuals promoting the philosophy of diversity, in other words, those who object to majoritarianism such as Rawls, will be seen talking about and showing their antipathy to medieval Western history dominated by the power of religious institutions. Rawls felt the need to remind us of the dangerous situation that could occur if religion or religious institutions were given a predominant role in the state. He also convincingly said that liberalism generally had its roots in the Church Reform movement and was known as one of the contributors that undermined the power of religious institutions (Laborde 2017, 92). This further shows that historical trauma in general cannot be erased from the memory of intellectuals who initiated theories of diversity, although there is a great distance between the era of the hegemony of religious institutions in Europe and the modern era.
The same attitude was also shown by Cecile Laborde, a political theorist supporting liberal egalitarianism. This attitude supports the state in not endorsing certain religions or religious institutions in relation to the state. When supporting the idea of liberal egalitarianism, Laborde apparently could not let go of the historical trauma of the West’s dark history. This can be detected from the way in which Laborde brought up Locke’s defense of the plurality of understandings from the grip of the monopoly of religious institutions and the need to trim the role of religion in the public sphere (Laborde 2017, 15). Laborde frankly acknowledged that one reason why the idea emerged regarding liberating the state from the influence of a comprehensive doctrine such as religion is that there had been acute conflicts in the past, so liberal countries needed a standpoint that did not refer to one religious doctrine (Laborde 2018, 5). Laborde was referring to the history of religious wars and the hegemony of religious institutions in the West in the Middle Ages.

So, it can be said that often Western thinkers who try to stay away from majoritarianism, especially when carried out by religion or religious institutions, have directly or indirectly experienced their own historical trauma. This historical bias is then multiplied in the many analyses and philosophies of the thinkers that are then reproduced in the ideas and logic of intellectuals, both directly and indirectly. A particular criticism of the intellectuals who oppose majoritarianism is the self-evident conclusion that majoritarianism, especially that practiced by religious groups, will lead to authoritarianism and the oppression of minority groups. It is an argument that is very traumatic in terms of history, even though not all forms of majoritarianism will lead to authoritarianism.

This historical trauma cannot necessarily be justified by other histories. The Ottoman government of Turkey, for example, was very tolerant of the minorities of a number of religious followers so they could carry out their religious internal regulations under the leadership of religious leaders (Kia 2011, 112 and Hefner 2014, 640). Another example is the government of Umar ibn Khattab who developed a life of tolerance
toward Christian minority groups in Jerusalem through the Aelia Agreement (Rubin 2011, 52).

Moreover, majoritarianism does not always exist in tandem with a religious state. Majoritarianism, to a certain extent, can also co-exist with a system of other ideas, including liberalism. A number of multiculturalist liberal intellectuals who defend diversity are not narrowed by the majoritarianism logic previously rejected by intellectuals who tended to be liberal. The logic of majoritarianism, as discussed by liberal multiculturalists, is related to the extent to which liberalism can accommodate religious minorities, when in liberal political communities, these religious minorities have aspirations and practices that are contrary to the liberal majority.

In addressing this question, political theorists started to practice the logic of majoritarianism, as evidenced by Will Kymlicka, Joseph Raz, and Robert Quong. Kymlicka’s viewpoint that includes the logic of majoritarianism can be seen when he talks about a number of religious minorities such as the Hutterite or the Amish who have different views to liberalism; they can even be thought of as violating the principles of liberalism. The case referred to by Kymlicka was one that occurred in the midst of the Hutterite community when members who left were then asked to give up their ownership rights. This obligation to give up ownership of property, by the Hutterite community, was seen as a consequence of the members leaving the group. When the case was brought to court, the Hutterite community won. This was later criticized by Kymlicka who said that the decision was wrong, because the Hutterite minority community was seen as violating the principle of liberalism held by the majority (Cohen-Almagor 2018, 19).

Kymlicka did not take steps against religious minorities that tended to be illiberal, but he continued to provide a broad space for liberalism and for activists who were committed to the principles of liberalism. This helped to maintain social pressure so that principles of liberalism, as shared by the majority, were accepted by minority groups. If religious minorities had practiced severe violations such as slavery, genocide, and mass murder, the state may have intervened (Courtois 2008, 48).
Moreover, Kymlicka was very skeptical of internal restrictions that were often practiced by religious minorities. On another occasion, he strongly discouraged the state from providing group rights in the context of internal restrictions. He took this action because he did not want the rights of minority groups to undermine the principles of liberalism held by the majority (Stjernfelt 2012, 56).

A similar attitude is also held by Raz on more or less the same issue, which is the extent to which liberalism, as held by the majority, has a number of rights that must be respected. This is reflected in Raz’s idea that emphasizes the importance of the liberal majority, promotes the understanding of secularism, and has an obligation to promote the value of the majority in the context of a state, so that the state as a representation of liberal values becomes the guardian of liberalism. Any group that rejects secularism is not a liberal group (Harding 2014, 248).

Indeed, Raz does not recommend non-liberal groups to use repressive actions that cause them to be oppressed and depressed. However, minority groups are encouraged to continue to integrate with the dominant liberal values. Raz’s attitude shows that the dominant liberal values must be supported and cannot be defeated by minority values when there is a clash between the two (Kim 2015, 72).

The same attitude is also shown by Jonathan Quong. This contemporary liberal thinker also cannot tolerate the notion of illiberal minorities who have the right to justify the illiberalism of the minorities. In Quong’s view, minority groups can only have rights related to citizenship. Their citizenship rights cannot be eliminated simply because the group rejects liberalism. However, these minorities do not have the right to hold illiberal rights. Illiberal rights are those used to practice activities or objectives that do not respect the principles of freedom and equality. Such groups cannot have rights if they continue to carry out illiberalism (Ekeli 2012, 186).

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3 Group rights, in the context of providing limitations, are exercised by a group (particularly minority groups) for the rights of its members in order to maintain internal harmony and stabilization.
For Quong, the system of liberal ideas has the privilege of limiting the use of a right. This means that a certain group has rights, except in contexts where the group cannot exercise their right as a way of pursuing non-liberal objectives, or in Quong’s terminology, it is called an unreasonable objective. Some concrete examples are given by Quong, such as not having the right to enact hate speech or not having the right to join an organization or political party that is racist. Additionally, there is no right to fight for a racist party to be elected in the general election (Ekeli 2012, 187).

For political liberals such as Quong, a rather restrictive method can only be carried out if a group or person has exceeded what is called public justification that includes several things, such as (1) the fact of reasonable pluralism, (2) reasonable citizens, (3) political conception, (4) overlapping consensus, and (5) public reason. Therefore, illiberal citizens, in Quong’s terminology, are known as unreasonable citizens and are included in one of the conditions for a restriction to be applied. This is where we can see the relevance of majoritarianism in Quong’s ideas (Vallier 2017, 177).

Examples of the attitudes of liberals increasingly show that majoritarianism not only is the monopoly of religious institutions or religious ideas but also lives and develops in the intellectual environment of liberals. In such a situation, it is no exaggeration to say that the majoritarianism that is often pinned to religious groups, and also often accused of being authoritarian, has now become irrelevant or simply a myth that is more stigmatized than factual. In the end, the rivals of religious groups, such as liberals, also adopt majoritarianism without hesitation.

It could also be that the existence and development of majoritarianism among Western liberals proves that majoritarianism is a destiny or intellectual way of thinking. It can be seen how the majority must remain being a factor that is considered even a determinant in the end of a policy, agreement, or legal adoption. Therefore, the point that should be a common concern, especially in Pancasila, is not the total rejection of majoritarianism, but rather the rejection of a type of majoritarianism that has turned authoritarian and tyrannical. Likewise, we should reject
the claim that every type of majoritarianism will certainly turn out to be authoritarian. Taking into account these concerns, majoritarianism can be put back in its proper place, without having to negate it totally. The total negation and bad press of majoritarianism, as often carried out by liberals, will eventually “backfire,” as is happening with a number of liberal intellectuals who eventually adopted majoritarianism.

Thus, trying to relate *Pancasila* to public reason, which then has consequences for anti-majoritarianism, seems inappropriate. Moreover, majoritarianism has also been adopted by liberals as a consequence of the demands of society. This should also apply to *Pancasila*. Therefore, *Pancasila* cannot be separated from majoritarianism in certain regards as with other ideas. Separating *Pancasila* from majoritarianism can actually lead to the neglect of society’s ideals while leading to an ahistorical attitude toward the will of the nation’s founders, as majoritarianism can be traced back to the interpretation of a number of founding fathers such as Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim, Kasman Singodimedjo, and Mohammad Natsir.

Wahid Hasyim, despite being mentioned as having agreed to the omission of seven words in the Jakarta Charter, still has the spirit to fight for Islamic values (as the majority) without having to tyrannize the minorities. For him, fighting for Islamic values (Shari’a) can be done in a democratic way, between divinity and popular sovereignty. Moreover, another important thing is to do this without causing harm to minorities (Hasyim 2015, 938).  

Likewise, Agus Salim requires that public policies and laws issued by the state do not conflict with the teachings of the scriptures, especially the Qur’an. He even justifies his argument by citing the verse from al-Qur’an (Salim 1984, 438). This reflects Agus Salim’s attitude, which

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4 Wahid Hasyim wrote, “The desire of Muslims as the largest group and our nation will revive the religious shari’a given good paths and channels, but from the other side the principle of democracy is maintained so that the desire does not harm other groups. If here is explained about the existence of a compromise with democracy, it does not mean that if there is no compromise, there will certainly be things that are urgent and detrimental to the small number of religiously motivated groups.”

5 Agus Salim wrote, “If it will be in accordance with our basis of Pancasila, regardless of the directions that are important to the various religious thoughts, and whatever efforts to try or fight
considers the majority as one of the important aspects in making the laws that will affect the politics of the state.

Other Islamic figures also agreed with Wahid Hasyim and Agus Salim, as indicated by Kasman Singodimedjo. As a member of the PPKI (Preparatory Committee for Indonesian Independence) and the first Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, Kasman argues that the phrase “Belief in the One and Only God” has a strong meaning for the implementation of the Shari’a. Such a relation is inseparable because of either the sociological reality, where the majority is Muslims, or the interpretation of the constitutional language. That is why Kasman appealed to the Islamic community to be not too concerned with the changes in the phrase of the first principle (sila) of the Jakarta Charter by eliminating the seven words to be “Belief in the One and Only God” (Panitia Peringatan 75 Tahun Kasman 1981, 124–127).

Singodimedjo’s interpretation was reinforced by the views of Mohammad Natsir, the leader of Masyumi and the first Prime Minister of the parliamentary cabinet after the dissolution of the RIS (Republic of United States of Indonesia). He believes that the interpretation of Pancasila cannot and should not conflict with religious teachings, especially Islam, as embraced by the majority of Indonesian citizens. For him, the interpretation of Pancasila that is contrary to Islam will be problematic and contradictory to the substance of Pancasila itself (Natsir 1978, 246–247).

for each of their objectives, the first and foremost, they cannot violate the first basic principle, i.e., Belief in the One Supreme God. Strictly speaking, it would not be possible to deviate from the religious laws which are based on the revelation rather than the God Almighty according to the word of Allah in Al-Qur’an three consecutive times, namely S. Almaidah.”

6 Kasman Singodimedjo wrote, “And all interpretations of the Belief in the One Supreme God, both according to their historical interpretation and their meanings and understandings, are in accordance with the interpretation given by Islam, namely the prevailing religion and treated in Indonesia, the religion adhered to by more than 90 percent.” Kasman wrote again, “They forget, that God Almighty in Pancasila and the Constitution guarantees the upholding of God’s law, namely Islam with its manifestations (al-Quran).”

7 Mohammad Natsir wrote, “We hope that Pancasila in its journey of seeking content since it was established, will not be filled with teachings that oppose al-Quran. Divine revelations that have for centuries become the blood of flesh for most of our nation. And it should also not be used to oppose the implementation of the rules and teachings contained in al-Quran … which they want to contribute the content to the formation and development of the nation and state in a parliamentary and democratic way.”
Considering that the anti-majoritarianism attitude tends to contain an acute historical bias and that majoritarianism is a social disposition that is adopted by almost all existing systems of ideas and considers the interpretations of the founding fathers such as Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim, Kasman Singodimedjo, and Mohammad Natsir, the attitude of total rejection of majoritarianism is one that is not philosophically valid and cannot be defended. What is needed is not total rejection of majoritarianism, but proper introduction at the right moment.

Second is the principle of a neutral state. The adoption of public reason also requires groups within a diverse political community to be neutral and distance themselves from certain values or comprehensive doctrines, whether from a religion or a philosophy. This certainty can be seen from the attitudes of Latif and Magnis-Suseno, which require a neutral policy in terms of the state. Latif said that the state must not be inclined to one single religion so that it will not only be represented by one religion (Latif 2011, 119).

This issue of a neutral state has also become a fierce point of discussion between contemporary political theorists. The question that revolves around the issue of neutrality is what is meant exactly by neutrality. Furthermore, is it possible for neutrality to be achieved? In general, neutrality has at least four meanings. The first meaning is neutrality of outcome, i.e., the results of a policy or political decision do not have an impact only on certain groups. When it affects only certain groups, the neutrality of outcomes cannot be achieved. The second is neutrality of opportunity, the claim that all ways of life, doctrines, or groups are given equal opportunities in order to guarantee freedom and equality. Next, is neutrality of justification, namely, the claim that new policies can be achieved neutrally if policies or decisions do not use justifications that come from certain groups within a political community. The last is neutrality of aim, the claim that a new neutrality will be achieved
if the issued policies or political decisions do not promote the values or conceptions of goodness that certain groups hold (Franken 2016, 3–5).

Of the four variants of neutrality, the last two neutralities (justification and aim) are variants that are often discussed by scholars. The first two variants, neutrality of outcome and opportunity, tend to be abandoned because they are considered difficult to achieve. Neutrality of outcome cannot be achieved because it is considered difficult to realize consistently in practice. It is deemed difficult as sometimes a policy requires segmentation. For example, smoking bans in certain areas will provide less space for smokers than for non-smokers. Non-smokers can carry out their activities anywhere, whereas smoker segmentation means that smokers have less space because they are prohibited in various public spheres, so the policy is considered not neutral to smokers. The same applies to neutrality of opportunity. The concept of neutrality that tries to provide equal space and freedom is unable to provide equality and freedom to all ideas of value and goodness that are often adopted by certain groups (Franken 2016, 5).

For these reasons, Franken states that it is more possible to maintain neutrality of justification and aim than neutrality of outcome and opportunity. But can neutrality of justification and aim be maintained or valid as concepts that are indeed worth developing? This question results in a certain degree of doubt and can be raised again as a method of evaluating the concept of a neutral state that has been firmly held by liberals and a number of Indonesian intellectuals.

Doubts about the validity of neutrality of justification arose when Rawls, a defender of neutrality of justification, failed to escape the partiality of certain ideas of goodness. In this context, this is a concept of liberal goodness. At first, Rawls was quite confident that the ideas of political liberalism that he built along with various microconceptions (public reason, overlapping consensus, veils of ignorance, and others) could be neutral as they were based on universal equality and freedom for all. However, when talking about political liberalism, Rawls had to rely on the notion of capacity as a concept of goodness, one which gives individuals the freedom to form, revise, and pursue a concept of good-
ness that is typical of the characteristics of liberal autonomy. As a result, Rawls was stuck in the autonomy trap that he has previously refused. Autonomy is indeed the basis of liberalism, which is as important as other bases of liberalism (Franken 2016, 17).

To give a concrete example, Rawls’s inconsistency was seen in the case of Wisconsin V. Yoder when the Supreme Court of the United States of America ruled that children aged 14 years and over from Amish minority groups were excluded from the obligation to study. For Rawls, the Supreme Court’s decision was not right because liberal countries must provide a basis for capacity as a concept of goodness so that individuals may choose, revise, and pursue this in their lives. Moreover, it can easily be provided to its citizens by having compulsory education. But according to Franken, Rawls cannot be neutral because when he convinced the state to participate in encouraging the principles of autonomous liberalism (by educating its citizens to be autonomous in their attitude and manner), he had taken sides with autonomous liberalism (Franken 2016, 18).

Thus, in truth, neutrality cannot be truly neutral, even though it is affirmed by supporters of neutrality as a form of neutrality. This impossibility is caused because parties competing in a system or in a policy formulation will side with one of two or several competitors. When policies are formulated automatically, they will attract one competitor and reject the other. This includes when a value competes with another value. At one point, a value will be adopted and the other rejected (Breen 2009, 549–550). That is what has caused a number of political scholars, from liberals such as William Galston, Charles Larmore, and Bruce Ackerman, to acknowledge that policies or the selection of truly neutral values as envisioned by supporters of neutral states cannot actually be achieved (Breen 2009, 549).

Additionally, linking state neutrality, both in the form of neutrality of justification or neutrality of aim, to Pancasila also does not demonstrate a valid argument. This is due to the historical characteristics of Pancasila itself, as interpreted by Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim, Kasman, and Natsir, who wanted religion to influence all state policies. Wahid
Hasyim wanted it in the form of a struggle for Islamic values (Shari’a) that were active in state institutions and society, whereas Agus Salim wanted it in a more passive form of reviewing how regulatory state products and institutions did not come into conflict with basic religious values. That means, in fact, that the state is not always neutral. In certain circumstances, the state needs justification from the religious realm as the implementation of divinity, which became the first principle of Pancasila.

This also causes the neutrality of justification and aim, as derivatives of public reason, to not always able to be used when interpreting Pancasila. For example, in LGBT cases, it will be difficult to apply the principle of public reason in the form of neutrality of justification or neutrality of aim. Pancasila wants the religious doctrine to influence the state whereas public reason does not because it is seen as incompatible with neutrality of justification and aim. This shows that Pancasila and public reason and its derivatives, especially neutrality of justification or of aim, are incompatible.

A similar case occurred in a debate about adultery that led to many intellectual debates between the groups that wanted an article of law to be included in the national legal regulations and groups that opposed it. One of the arguments used by the group rejecting sanctions for adultery was public reason, as they believed that religion does not affect the state, including the state authority to restrict and sanction adultery.

Third is the principle of substantial elements in religion (universalism). The consequence that is often mentioned in terms of the relation between Pancasila and public reason is to raise the value of religion, which is considered universal, to leave a partial value that is considered as not representing togetherness. In Latif’s view, this is described as the application of Pancasila as the embodiment of civil religion (Latif 2011, 110).

The series of discourses that Latif brought were consistent with those brought by Nurcholish Madjid. Madjid himself was greatly influenced by Robert N. Bellah who was quite famous for the idea of civil religion. The question that then arose was whether it was right to take Bellah’s
concept of civil religion and draw Madjid’s conclusions that religion could only be drawn into the realm of the state as long as it affected universal issues?

The universalization that Nurcholish Madjid referred to was meant to draw religious teachings substantially closer. It is very close to the idea of Protestant ethics that is popular in the United States (US) and the idea of civil religion as put forward by Robert N. Bellah.\(^8\) According to Madjid, the US is the best example of drawing the line of Christianity through the process of universalization so that it becomes something universal. Through the process of universalization, Christian values that exist in US society appear to be not exclusive and can be accepted by groups outside of Christianity from something previously exclusive and particular. Values such as freedom, legal order, personal rights, and human rights are universal things that can be understood by all interfaith circles. Thus, these values later became a kind of civil religion, although the individual religious commitment of each individual was not lost. A person can still support human rights, freedom, and legal order from their respective religious bases. However, when drawn to a level that is no longer personal (political, legal, and public), the base becomes a civil religion with its universal value (Madjid 1998, 171–172).

Hence, it can be said that this universalization was then used by Madjid as one component of Pancasila relating to the interpretation of the divinity principle (Belief in the One and Only God). This can be seen from his conversation that presented the idea of universalization against the background of Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution. In fact, he encouraged Pancasila to adopt what was initiated by Bellah.

With Madjid’s explanation, one can see and understand the direction desired by those who want to raise the issue of universalism. Universalism can be said to be derivative or inseparable from the idea of public reason. Therefore, intellectuals who relate Pancasila to public reason often raise the idea of universalization as it was built by Nurcholish Madjid, who borrowed Bellah’s ideas, and later applied them in the context of Pancasila. He thinks that there is a belief that Pancasila

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\(^8\) Regarding the ideas of Robert N. Bellah concerning civil religion, see Bortolini (2012).
and public reason are always directly proportional, even though it is not always so.

Such universalization efforts can be questioned because the relationship between Pancasila and religion does not always derive from universal ideas as evidenced by Latif and Madjid. A number of national founding fathers such as Wahid Hasyim, Agus Salim, Kasman, and Natsir did not necessarily use universalization as the only way to explain the relationship between Pancasila and religion, as explained earlier regarding their attitude towards Islam.

Law No. 1/PNPS/1965 is one example that can show how universalization with the characteristics of public reason does not always fit with Pancasila or the 1945 Constitution, so that in a moment of universalization it becomes invalid. This Law, when placed on a universal scale, instead represents the phenomenon of adopting religious ideas, because in a liberal country, religious sects that give new interpretations that are disassociated from the core doctrines of religion are not being restricted by the state, so they are different from what is applied in that Law. In Indonesia, the misinterpretation of religious principles can be seen as blasphemy.⁹

Liberal states did not apply restrictions because of the influence of Locke’s ideas. As a figure who viewed religion and state as different authorities, Locke, a pioneer figure in 18⁰ century Western liberalism, opposed religious and state restrictions on religious groups that interpreted religion differently to the main religion, though religious interpretations are an essential part of a religion. For Locke, religious restrictions are not universal, so restrictions cannot be applied to different religious groups. Locke agreed to restrictions on an activity if universal areas were affected, such as existence (life), health, ownership, and other freedoms. Restrictive authorities are carried out by state institutions rather than religious institutions (Alzate 2014, 225).

Besides, the idea of religious universalism relates to secularization because religious universalism is another form of differentiation, as described by a number of sociologists such as Jose Casanova and Steve

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⁹ This happened to Ahmadiyah Indonesia. For the dynamics of the debate, see Burhani (2014).
Bruce (Hood 2015, 244 and Bruce 2011, 49). The close relation between universalism and differentiation lies in the placement of religion in the domain of civil society, and given that religion cannot influence state politics, it only fills the political area of the state as an ideal and not as a doctrinal aspiration. When religion is separated in the area of civil society, it leaves the state to be filled with content that is considered universal. As explained by Nurcholish Madjid, religion was drawn to issues such as compliance to legal order, freedom, personal rights, and other kinds of freedom that became cross-religious issues. As mentioned by Casanova, differentiation is a variant of secularization which means a distinction between religious institutions (church institutions) and secular institutions (state, economy, science, art, entertainment, health, and welfare) whose process dates from pre-modern to contemporary (Casanova 2011, 54). Therefore, it is not appropriate for Latif to say that Indonesia (Pancasila), which is neither a secular state nor a religious state, is then aligned with the distinctive differentiation of Casanova (Latif 2011, 111) because Pancasila does not legitimize this form of secularization.

With this criticism, the future interpretation of Pancasila must abandon models such as anti-majoritarianism, the neutral state, and universalism, which are not properly placed. The interpretation of Pancasila that must be developed is one that treats majoritarianism moderately, especially religious majoritarianism, because Pancasila is based on “Belief in the One and Only God.” The principles of majoritarianism must be considered and should not be violated, so that on a number of issues, it must be in favor of the majority (not the neutral state). Majoritarianism must be valued and can affect many policies. There should be no policies conflicting with religious doctrines, especially the majority religion. The impact of universalism must be put in its place without having to abandon the religious doctrines as interpretations.

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9 Bruce and Casanova explained the term differentiation with slight differences. Although Bruce and Casanova’s general ideas about differentiation seem similar, Bruce explained differentiation in the context where religious influences in the public sector are disappearing, whereas Casanova believed that such influences were still there, especially in civil society as he noticed a de-privatization of religion, not the other way around.
of the principle of “Belief in the One and Only God.” However, this model of understanding does not mean adhering to majoritarianism, which is tyrannical and oppresses minorities. The impact of tyranny on minorities should be avoided as much as possible because one of the important principles of constitutionalism is protecting minorities.

CONCLUSIONS

The above discussion describes how relating the interpretation of Pancasila with public reason is not always right. Many aspects linked to the relationship between them are questionable in terms of their relevance because public reason itself provides certain derivative consequences that can come under criticism. The three derivative consequences, anti-majoritarianism, neutral state, and universalism, cannot be applied to Pancasila, so the relationship between Pancasila and public reason is not always positive. In one aspect of Pancasila, it must avoid anti-majoritarianism, as practiced by almost all existing systems of ideas, including the one that dominates the world, liberalism, as long as majoritarianism is carried out without oppressing minority groups.

Pancasila, in certain regards, also shows that it cannot be described as neutral, as Pancasila indeed describes one variety of options, as other systems of ideas also do. Therefore, it cannot be considered as neutral. Moreover, to a certain degree, Pancasila must use religious justifications.

Finally, Pancasila cannot forever focus on universalism as a modus vivendi. This does not mean that Pancasila cannot be applied to universal issues. It can still be used as an approach to universal issues as long as it is not deterministic and stays true to its nature, which is to promote religious values. Evidently, Indonesia still treats certain matters in the realm of universalism, which are not all universalistic, as defined by a number of figures such as the idea of civil religion by Robert N. Bellah.
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